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Dismissal-Nonsuit-When Motion Granted.-A 
determines that 
stantial evidence to «mnn.~vt. a verdict for 
!d.-Nonsuit-When Motion Granted: Trial-Directed Ver-
dict.-Where raises an inference that fact exists 
evidence of nonexistence the fact 
uncontradicted and of such nature 
cannot be nonexistence of the 
fact established as a matter of law; these circumstances 
the inference as a matter of if the fact 
inferred is necessary to establish an essential element of 
case, a nonsuit or directed verdict is proper. 




his own witnesses but 
510 LEONARD v. WATSONVILI,E CoMMUNITY HosP. [47 0.2d 
(6] !d.-Examination of Adverse Party-Effect of Testimony.-
The provision in Code Civ. Proc., § 2055, that a party calling an 
adverse witness shall not be bound by his testimony does not 
mean that such testimony may not be given its proper weight, 
but merely that the party calling such witness shall not be con-
cluded from rebutting his testimony or from impeaching him. 
[7a, 7b] !d.-Examination of Adverse Party-Effect of Testimony. 
-An inference on which plaintiff relies may be completely dis-
pelled as a matter of law by evidence given by adverse wit-
nesses called under Code Civ. Proc., § 2055, provided the 
evidence is clear, positive, uncontradicted and of such a nature 
that it cannot rationally be disbelieved. 
[8] Evidence-Presumptions-Operation and Effect.-A presump-
tion is dispelled as a matter of law only when a fact which is 
wholly irreconcilable with it is proved by uncontradicted 
testimony of the party relying on it or of such party's own 
witnesses. 
[9] Witnesses-Examination of Adverse Party-Effect of Testi-
mony.-A presumption favorable to plaintiff cannot be dis-
pelled as a matter of law by testimony of defendant given 
pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 2055, because a defendant called 
under such section is not treated as plaintiff's witness; an 
inference, on the other hand, may be dispelled as a matter of 
law by evidence produced by either party. 
[10] !d.-Examination of Adverse Party-Effect of Testimony.-
If evidence given by adverse witnesses called by plaintiff un-
der Code Civ. Proc., § 2055, establishes as a matter of law that 
one of several defendants in a malpractice case is free from 
negligence, a prima facie case against such defendant based on 
the inference of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur should fall, and plaintiff's position with respect to 
such defendant should be the same as if she had failed to 
prove all facts necessary to raise the inference. 
[11] !d.-Determination of Credibility-Disregarding Testimony. 
-A witness may be disbelieved if there is any rational ground 
for doing so, and the interest of a party in the result of a case 
will in some circumstances justify the trier of fact in dis-
regarding his testimony. 
[12] Physicians-Malpractice--Res Ipsa Loquitur.-On defendant 
surgeon's motion for nonsuit at the close of the ease of plaintiff 
in whose abdomen a clamp had been left during an opera-
tion, in part of which he assisted, the inference of negligence 
raised against him under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was 
dispelled as a matter of law by the uncontradicted testimony 
given by him and codefendant doctors when en lled as adversr 
witnesses under Code Civ. Proc., § 20!55, to the effect that said 
[6] See Cal.Jur., Witnesses, §50; Am.Jur., Witnesses, § 560. 
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surgeon was not responsible for leaving the clamp in plaintiff's 
abdomen, particularly where his exoneration had the necessary 
effect of increasing the possibility of liability on the part of 
all other defendants. 
[13] Hospitals-Actions-Inferences.-In an action for damages 
brought by plaintiff in whose abdomen a clamp had been left 
during an operation, testimony of a hospital employee relied 
on to dispel the inference of negligence on the part of a 
surgical nurse and the hospital could be disbelieved by the 
trier of fact where she had an interest in the outcome of the 
case because of her relationship with the hospital and because 
the hospital, as employer, would be liable for acts of the 
nurse within the scope of employment. 
[14] Id.-Actions-Inferences.-In an action for damages brought 
by plaintiff in whose abdomen a clamp had been left during an 
operation, a hospital employee's testimony, if accepted by the 
trier of fact as true, was not of the character required to dis-
pel the inference of negligence raised against the hospital 
and a surgical nurse, where it would not conclusively establish 
that the hospital and nurse were free from negligence. 
[15] Evidence-Judicial Notice.-It is a matter of common knowl-
edge that no special skill is required in counting instruments. 
[16] Hospitals-Actions-Evidence.-With respect to liability of 
a hospital and surgical nurse for injuries sustained by plain-
tiff as a result of a clamp being left in her abdomen during an 
operation, proof of practice or custom employed by other 
hospitals and nurses in the community is some evidence of 
what should be done and may assist in determination of what 
constitutes due care, but it does not conclusively establish the 
standard of care. 
[17] Usages and Customs-Usage as Affecting Negligence.-Gen-
eral negligence cannot be excused on the ground that others 
in the same locality practice the same kind of negligence. 
[18] Hospitals- Actions- Questions of Law and Fact.-In an 
action for damages brought by plaintiff in whose abdomen a 
clamp had been left during an operation, it could not be said 
as a matter of law that there was no duty on the part of the 
hospital and nurses to keep an instrument count in order to 
assist the surgeon in determining whether all instruments 
used had been removed from the patient before final closure. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Cruz County. James L. Atteridge, Judge. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
[17] See Cal.Jur., Usages and Customs, § 11; Am.Jur., Usages 
and Customs, § 44. 
Lacy. Plaintiff was unconscious 
which lasted five 
siderable pain the 10 she remained in 
pital following the operation, and the 
several months after she returned home. 
taken about six months after the operation revealed 
lodged in the upper quadrant of her abclome11. The 
was removed, and this 
recover from the 
surgical nurse. At the 
for nonsuit 
the 
are whether inference of 
gence was raised under the doctrine of res 
whether, if such an inference arose, it 
matter of law. 
Evelyn Craig, who was hospital, 
and defendants Lacy, were called 
to under section 2055 Code of 
which provides that in a civil action 
call and examine an adverse 
The of , who was in of the 
may be summarized as follows: He scheduled the 
after deciding that an exploratory examination the upper 
of abdomen should made. The 
1The case against Lacy and Siegal was settled after the nonsuits were 
granted as to the other defendants. 
W ATSONVIIJLE CoMMUNITY HosP. 513 
[ 47 C.2d 305 P.2d 36] 
cision from 
which was 
About 40 minutes after the operation was begun, Lacy 
Eiskamp, who had been performing surgery in 
of the to look at plaintiff's gall bladder. 
Eiskamp made a visual and recommended that 
the gall bladder be removed. After Eiskamp left the room, 
Lacy and Slegal discovered a "mass" in the sigmoid colon, 
which appeared to be cancerous. Lacy again consulted Eis-
kamp, ·who that the mass should be removed and 
offered to help. rrhe doctors decided not to operate on the 
gall bladder, and, while Lacy began to close the upper half 
of the incision, Eiskamp and Siegal prepared to remove 
the mass, which was in the lower left quadrant. None of 
Eiskamp 's work was performed in the upper portion of 
plaintiff's abdomen, and he left the room before final closure 
of the incision. During the operation Lacy and Siegal used 
about 18 Kelly clamps which are uncurved scissors-shaped 
instruments. Eiskamp did not use anything but curved 
clamps. Lacy paid Siegal his fee but never received a bill 
from Eiskamp for his services. 
Lacy further testified that the surgical nurse keeps a set 
of instruments on a tray very close to the surgical field and 
that one of her principal functions is to hand instruments 
to the doctor and take them back from him. No request for 
an instrument count vvas made by Lacy. The practice of 
hospitals generally is to maintain a sponge count before 
closure of an incision and to account for the needles used 
in suturing. This practice is followed by the nurses at 
defendant hospital. 
Siegal's testimony substantially confirmed that of Lacy 
as to the sequence of events in the operating room. He said 
that Eiskamp did not take part in closing the upper portion 
of the incision and left before final closure of the abdomen. 
Eiskamp testified that no Kelly clamps were used in his 
part of the operation, that he "had nothing to do with the 
gall bladder" and that in order to speed the operation he 
worked with Siegal on the tumor in the lower left quadrant 
of the abdomen. 
47 C.2d-17 
strument 
and needles are 
is made if requested by the surgeon. 
[1] When a foreign object is left in a 
patient's abdomen it is ordinarily the result of the 
of someone. (Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d 82 P.2d 409].) 
And where a patient receives unusual while un-
conscious, all of the persons who had any control over his 
body or the instrumentalities which might have caused the 
injuries may properly be called upon to meet the inference 
of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct. 
(Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 
1258].) The evidence is sufficient to rmse an inference 
of negligence under the doctrine of res as to 
Eiskamp, Pogatschnik and the assisted 
in the operation; at one time or another during the operation 
the control of the instrument left in plaintiff's was in 
the hands of the nurse; the hospital the nurse and 
furnished and reassembled the instruments. This places upon 
them the burden of initial 
supra.) 
Plaintiff contends that the inference of res loquitur 
was not dispelled as a matter of law and that therefore the 
court erred in granting the motion for a nonsuit. [2] The 
same test is applicable in determining when the res lo-
quitur inference is dispelled as a matter of law as in deciding 
when any other inference is conclusively rebutted. (See 
Rose v. Melody Lane, 39 Cal.2d 487 [247 P.2d 335] ; 
Lcet v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 25 Cal.2d 605, 621-622 [155 
P .2d 158 A.L.R. 1008].) [3] It has long been the rule 
in this state that a nonsuit may be granted only when, dis-
regarding conflicting evidence, giving to the plaintiff's evi-
dence all the value to which it is legally entitled, and indulging 
WATSONVILLE CoMMUNITY HosP. 515 
305 P.2d 36] 




of res as a matter of law was elicited from 
witnesses called under section 2055 of the Code of Civil Pro-
and contends that such evidence cannot be 
an inference on which 
Section 2055 in effect that a party 
to a civil action may be examined as if under cross-examination 
by the adverse and that the party examining such 
witness shall not be bound by the witness' testimony and 
may rebut it other evidence. Before section 2055 was 
a who called an adverse party to testify 
found that the witness >Yas treated as his own and that his 
2Section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: ''A party to 
the record of any civil action or proceeding or person for whose 
immediate benefit such action is prosecuted or defended, 
or the directors, officers, member, agent, employee, or 
of any or person, or the agent, officer or 
a municipal which is a party t0 the action or 
be the adverse as if under cross-
witnesses. 
his testimon;-, 
hutted hy the party 
Such when so 
matters 
to examination of other 
witness shall not be bound 
glven },y such witness may be re-
him for snch examination hy other evidence. 
be examined by his own counsel, hut 
on such examination.'' 
0.2d 
examination was to direct 
examination. (See Smcllie Southcm Pac. 212 Cal. 540, 
555 [299 P. 529] .) [5] This rule by section 
2055 so that elicited a under this section 
of his mvn witnesses bnt as testi-
mony obtained of the defendant's 
witnesses. 212 Cal. 540, 556 
[299 P. 529] ; 782 P. 425, 
15 A.hR. 192].) [6] It is clear, lwwever, that all such 
testimony is evidence in the ease and that the m 
the section that a party au ar\yerse witness shaH not 
be bound by his does not mean that snch 
may not be giwn its proper 
declares, that the party 
concluded from or from impeaching 
tho witness." 184 Cal. 775, 782 r195 P. 
425, 15 A.hH. 192] ; flOC Smcllie V. Southern rae. 212 Cal. 
540, 559 [299 P. 529] ; Dempsey v. Star IImtsc Inc., 
2 Cal.App.2d 720, 722 [38 P.2t1 ; 1:3 Cal.Tdlev. 302.3 ) 
[7a] It has been squarely held that an infrrence upon 
which a plaintiff relies may be completely dispelled as a 
matter of law by evidence givm by witnesses called under 
section 2055. ( Cnmch v. Gilmore Oil Ltd., 5 Cal.2d 330 
[54 P.2d 709] .) In the Crouch ease an inference that one 
Smith was an agent of defendant arose from proof of the 
fact that the defendant's aclvertising insignia was painted 
on trucks operated by Smith. Evidence >vas adduced under 
section 2055 ·which the court found the inference 
as a matter of law, and it was held that a nonsuit was proper. 
Our decision in Crowe v. McBride, 25 Cal.2d 318 [153 P.2d 
727], is not inconsistent with the holding in the Crouch 
ease. As will be seen from an rxamination of the opinion 
in C1'0We v. 111cBricle, the involved was whether the 
evidence was sufficient to present a question for the trier of 
fact, and in this connection we held that the testimony of the 
defendant given pursuant to an examination under section 
2055 was evidence in the ease and could be used to establish a 
cause of action against him. The use of evidence elicited 
3ln an article entitled "Some Recent Cases in ' 13 Cal. 
L.Rcv. 285, 302 (192fi), Professor A. M. Kid1l, in on sec-
tion 2055, said: ''The section states that n ealling ndversc 
party slwll not be hound by his testimony, ns were ever lJOund 
by the testimony of any witness. ·what was was tlwt an adverse 
party called as a witness might he examined nnd impeached to the same 
extent as the ordinary witness.'' 
Co:Yr:MUNITY HosP. 517 
P.2d 36] 
inference was not involved. 
relies upon the following language m 
sttpra: ''In considering the propriety of 
the nonsuit, we must the evidence most favorable to 
and that which is unfavorable. The testi-
mony of the u<J.Lc.uuau who was called to 
tion the Code of Civil 
under sec-
falls within this 
evidence in the case insofar as it 
is favorable to This must, of course, 
be read in the of the facts of the case and the question 
nPr«u>ntr>ci for determination. It is correct as a general prop-
and it should not be a strained interpreta-
tion to reach conclusion on a matter not presented to or 
considered by the court. 
Cases involving the use of evidence adduced under section 
must be distinguished from 
[8] speaking, it may 
is dispelled as a matter of law 
only when a fact which is wholly irreconcilable with it is 
proved by the uncontradicted testimony of the party relying 
on 1:t or of such own witnesses. 4 (Mar Shee v. Mary-
land Assttr. Corp., 190 Cal. 1, 9 [210 P. 269] ; Steward v. 
Paige, 90 Cal.App.2d 825 [20:3 P.2d 858] ; see Chak-
makjian v. Lowe, 33 Cal.2d 308, 313 [201 P.2d 801] ; Eng-
strom v. Attburn Auto. Sales Corp., 11 Cal.2d 64, 70 [77 P.2d 
1059] ; Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 540, 552 [299 
P. 529]; cf. v. 8 Cal.2d 294, 296 [65 P.2d 
65]; Levin v. Brown, 81 Cal.App.2d 913, 917 [185 P.2d 329] .) 
[9] Accordingly, it is the general rule that a p1·es1mtption 
favorable to a plaintiff cannot be so dispelled by the testi-
mony of a defendant given pursuant to section 2055 because 
a defendant called under that section is not treated as the 
plaintiff's witness. (Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 
540, 559 [299 P. 529]; Lopez v. ][night, 121 Cal.App.2d 387, 
390-391 [263 P.2d 452] ; Green v. Uarte, 87 Cal.App.2d 75, 
2055 to dispel a 
those 
'There is a recognized exception to the general rule where evidence 
of the opposite party is absolutely conclusive, as for instance, where the 
presumption of death of a person who has not been heard from in 
seven years is dispelled of the person in court. (See 
, .. Auburn Auto. Corp., 11 Cal.2d 64, 70 [77 P.2d 1079]; 
v. Smlthcrn Pac. Co., 213 Cal. 540, 552 [299 P. 529].) The 
general rule also is subject to the qualification that where testimony of 
the party relying on a presumption or of his witnesses is the product of 
mistake or inadvertence, such testimony will not operate to dispel the 
presumption. (See Mar Shee v. Maryland Assur. Corp., 190 Cal. 1, 9 
[210 P. 269].) 
because she was unconscious 
treatment that resulted in her lS 
of a liberalized test for res 
had any control over her 
and all persons who 
or the instrumentalities which 
have caused her meet the in-
ferenee of an of their con-
dnet. [10] If in these circumstances evideuee wit-
nesses under section 2055 establishes as a matter of law that 
one of the defendants is free from the facie 
case against that defendant based on the inference should 
fall, and plaintiff's position with to that defendant 
should be the same as if she had failed to prove all the facts 
necessary to raise the inference. 
[11] A witness may, of course, be disbelieved if there is 
any rational ground for so, and the interest of a 
in the result of a case will m some circumstances justify 
the trier of fact in his Ham-
ilton v. Abadjian, 30 53 [179 P.2d 
v. Reis, 21 Cal.2d 659-661 P.2d , 
Coffin, 20 Cal.2d 461-462 [126 P.2d 868].) There are 
where the interest of a in 
a judgment favorable to himself will not render all of his 
testimony subject to disbelief. For where part of 
a defendant's is harmful to him but favorable to 
a as where it tends to show that the witness il" 
liable or makes it more difficult for him to establish his own 
lack of fault, that portion of his may be used to 
rebut an inference unfavorable to the codefendant provided 
there is to indicate collusion or any other reason for 
disbelieving the testimony. 
[12] The evidence as to Eiskamp 's participation in the 
operation consisted of the testimony of Lacy, Siegal and 
Eiskamp, and it was clear and uncontradicted to the effect 
519 
absolve them 
and in view 
a favorable 
interest in the outcome of the case. She 
had an interest in the as to the nurse be-
cause the as employer, would be liable for acts of 
the nurse within the scope of ht>r employment. Craig's testi-
mony could therefore be disbelieved by the trier of fact. (See 
Hamilton v. 30 Cal.2d 49, 53 [179 P.2d 804]; Hickg 
v. Rm:s, 21 Ca1.2d 654. 659-661 f134 P.2d 788] ; Blank v. 
Co/fin, 20 Cal.2d 461-462 [126 P.2d 868] .) 
[14] 's testimony were accepted by thr 
trier of fact as it is not of the character required 
to the inference of negligence raised the hospital 
and the nurse. As we l1ave seen, Craig testified that it was 
the practice of in the area to count sponges and 
needles as of the operative procedure, and with respect 
to "other " she stated there was "no established 
practice of instrument either before or after sur-
gery.'' Even if we assume she intended to say that it was the 
11of to eount instruments, this evidenee would not 
conclusively establish that the hospital and nurse were free 
from These defendants seek to avoid liability 
on the that were required to exercise only that 
of skill other hospitals and nurses in the 
[15] It is matter of c•ommon knowledge, how-
skill is m instruments. 
lmdPr sueh eircumstanees of practice 
or evidence of what should be done and may 
assist in the detrrmination of what eonstitntes dne eare, it 
does not 0Rtablish tlH' standard of earn. Alvs 
520 LEOKARD 
v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d 100 ; Barham v. 
210 Cal. 206, 216 [291 P. ; Anderson 
.App.2d 761, 765 [109 P.2d ; Indcrbitzen v. Lane 
Hospital, 124 CaL.App. 462, 467 P.2d 744, 13 P.2d 905] .) 
[17] "General cannot be excused on 
that others in the same the same kind of 
gence." v. Ryan, 8 100 P.2d 409].) 
[18] \Ve cannot say as a matter of 
duty on the part of the 
ment count in order to assist the 
whether all instruments used had 
patient before final closure. 
from the 
The judgment is affirmed 
reversed as to defendants 
defendant and is 
munity Hospital. 
Traynor, J., Schauer, ,J., 
concurred. 
and \Vatsonville Com-
., and McComb, 
CARTER, J.-Concnrring and Disscnting.-The holding 
of the majority opinion may be epitomized as follows : .An 
inference of negligence which arises from testimony of ad-
verse witnesses examined under section 2055 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure may be dispelled by such testimony 
even though plaintiff is not bound thereby and is entitled 
to rely upon all of such which is fayorable to her 
and disregard all that is unfavorable. 'l'he unsoundness of 
this holding is so obvious that the mere statement of it 
should disclose its absurdity. It is not directly in 
confliet with the statutory law of this state (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 2055) but countless decisions of this court and of the 
appellate courts of the state. It is sheer double talk to say 
that evidence which is r~ot upon a may be relied 
upon to repel or dispel other evidence-an inference-in 
favor of such party. 
Section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that 
".A party to the record of any civil action or proceeding or 
a person for whose immediate benefit such action or proceeding 
is prosecuted or defended . . . may be examined by the 
adverse party as if under cross-examination, subject to the 
rules applicable to the examination of other witnesses. The 
party calling s1wh a<.:Zvcrse witness shall not be bound by his 
testimony, and the testirnony by sueh witness may be 
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509; 305 P.2d 36] 
added.) After noting that 
case at bar were whether an 
raised under the doctrine of 
res ipsa if such an inference arose, 
it was dispelled as a matter of law, we find this statement 
in the majority opinion: 
''Evelyn vvho was superintendent of the hospital, 
and defendants and Eiskamp were called by 
plaintiff to testify under section 2055 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, which that in a civil action a party may 
call and examine an aclver·sc witness." (Emphasis added.) 
Section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides a great 
deal more than the above quoted misleading statement would 
lead one to believe. In discussing the effect of section 2055, 
the following statement from the majority opinion is of 
interest: ''Section 2055 provides in effect that a party to a 
civil action may be examined as if under cross-examination 
by the adverse party and that the party examining such 
witness shall not be bound by the witness' testimony and 
may rebut it by other evidence. Before section 2055 was 
enacted, a litigant who called an adverse party to testify 
found that the witness was treated as his own and that his 
examination was restricted by the rules applicable to direct 
examination. (See Smcllic v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 
540, 555 [299 P. 529].) rrhis rule was changed by section 
2055 so that testimony elicited by a plaintiff under this 
section is not treated as testimony of his own witness but 
as testimony obtained under cross-examination of the de-
fendant's witnesses. (Smcllie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 
540, 556 [299 P. 529]; li'igari v. Olcese, 184 Cal. 775, 782 [195 
P. 425, 15 A.I.1.n. 192].)" 'l'he just quoted excerpt from 
the majority is more than misleading-and the cases cited 
do not stand for the proposition for which they are cited. 
1<-,or illustration, in the Smellie case, supra, at page 556, we 
find this court stating that section 2055 ''is a statute re-
medial in character, and as such should receive a construction 
by the courts ·which will carry into effect and accomplish the 
intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting it. This 
intent was, as we read the section, to enable a party to an 
action to call an adverse party as a witness for the purpose 
of eliciting such as said witness may testify to which 
are favorable to the party calling him, without being bound 
by any ad1Jcrse testimony which said witness may give. Only 
by such construction can the full remedial purposes of said 
1 erms of said section 
was the purpose of the 




more direct and 
directed verdict. In the case, a trial on the merits 
was involved and the court there held that '' 1'his 
may be 
its proper weight, but as it that the party 
calling such witness shall not be concluded from 
his testimony, or from the witness. 
Fabel, 132 U.S. 487 [33 L.Ed. 421, 10 S.Ct. 
Rose's U.S. Notes].)" In Daniels v. City & 
Francisco, 40 Cal.2d 614, 625 P.2d , 
of this court specifically held that "Plaintiffs maintain that 
'the instruction should have explained that any such 
elicited by the plaintiffs should weigh for them insofar as it 
was favorable, but that it should be disregarded insofar as it 
was ~mfavorable, if the matters to which it referred were not 
satisfactorily established by other evidence.' (Emphasis add-
ed.) But plaintiffs are relying upon authorities involving 
rulings upon a motion either for a nonsuit (jl;Jarchetti v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 204 Cal. 679, 686 [269 P. 529] ; Dempsey v. Star 
House Movers, Inc., 2 Cal.App.2d 720, 722 P.2d 825]) 
or for a directed verdict (Smellie v. Sotdhent Pac. Co., 212 
Cal. 540, 556 [299 P. 529] ; People v. Mahoney, 13 Cal.2d 729, 
736 [91 P.2d 1029] ). The rules therein stated have no 
application upon submission of the case for a determination 
of the factual issues on the merits. v. Olcese, 184 
Cal. 775, 782 [195 P. 425, 15 A.L.R. 192]; Darn v. Pichinino, 
105 Cal.App.2d 796, 800 [234 P.2d 307] .) The distinction 
is noted in the Smellie case, where, after a full discussion, it 
is stated that testimony elicited under section 2055 'is, of 
rourse, evidence in the case and may be considered in de-
termining the issues of the case upon the trial or final hearing 
by the court, or if the case is before a jury, the jury.' 
(212 Cal. 559; see, also, Green v. 136 Cal.App. 
32, 37-38 [28 P.2d 395]; Balasco v. Chick, 84 Cal.App.2d 
802, 808 [192 P.2d 76].) Since this case was submitted to 
the jury on the merits, the assailed instruction was proper. 
(Joseph v. Vogt, 35 Cal.App.2d 439, 441 [95 P.2d 947]; 
v. vVATSONVILLE CoMMUNITY HosP. 523 
C.2d 509; 305 P.2d 36] 
as a matter of 
1'he motion for nonsuit should have been denied. 
204 CaL 679 P. 
order 
a nonsuit. 
member of this court at one time or another, 
relied upon and stated the rule of law applicable when a 
motion for a nonsuit is made : '' '.l\.. motion for nonsuit may 
be and only when, disregarding 
to plaintiff's evidence all the 
value to which it is entitled, indulging in every 
inference which may be drawn from that evidence, 
the result is a determination that there is no evidence of 
sufficient substantiality to support a verdict in favor of the 
plaintiff." ... "Unless it can be said as a matter of law, 
that ... no other reasonable conclusion is legally deducible 
from the and that any other holding would be so 
support that a reviewing court would 
he impelled to reverse it upon appeal, or the trial court to 
set it aside as a matter of law, the trial court is not justified 
in taking the case from the jury." .. .' " (Seneris v. Haas, 
45 Ca1.2d 811, 821 [291 P.2d 915]; Carter, J.) In H•inds v. 
l>Fh 19 Ca1.2d 460 [121 P.2d 724 l, Mr. Chief 
,Justice Gibson in speaking for the court, said: "Where a 
is rendered upon a motion for nonsuit, the court 
must assume that all evidence received in favor of the plaintiff 
relevant to the issues is true. All p1·esurnptions, 'inferences 
ancl doubtful questions must be construed most favorably to 
the ... In such ipsa loquitur] cases an in-
ference arises that the accident resulted from a want of 
proper care on the part of the defendants. . . . It is in-
cumbent upon the defendant in such a case to bring forth 
evidence to rebut the inference of negligence, and under 
such circumstances a nonsuit is improper since the case 
;;;honlil be snbmittrd tn the jury." (Emphasis added.) Mr. 
Justice Shenk, for in Jlilana v. Credit 
Discount Co., 27 Cal.2d 336 165 A.L.R. 621], 
approved and relied upon the rule; in v. Sugarman, 
36 Cal.2d 152 [222 P.2d 665], and 36 Cal.2d 
654 [226 P.2d 574], Mr. ,Justice speaking for the 
court, approved and relied upon the rule; in Easton v. Ash, 
18 Cal.2d 530 [116 P.2d , Mr. ,Justice , speaking 
for the court, approved and relied upon the rule; in Palmquist 
v. ·JJ1ercer, 43 Cal.2d 92, 95 P.2d , Mr. Justice Spence, 
speaking for the court, approved and relied upon the rule; 
in Aguirre v. City of Los 46 Cal.2d 841 [299 P.2d 
862], Mr. Justice McComb, the court, approved 
and relied upon the rule. 
The above stated rule has been so firmly embedded in 
the law of this state, that I find it incomprehensible that a 
majority of the members of this eonrt should fail to realize 
that the above cases, and those following (to cite but a very 
few) will be overruled sub silento! (For statements and 
restatements of the rule, see: Schanfele v. Doyle (1890), 86 
Cal. 107 [24 P. 834]; ATchibalcl Estate v. Matteson (1907), 5 
Cal.App. 441 [90 P. 723]; IIerctdes Oil etc. Co. v. Hocknell 
(1907), 5 Cal.App. 702 [91 P. 341]; Leitch v. JJiarx (1913), 
21 Cal.App. 208 [131 P. 328] ; Jh?dew v. Shattuck & Nimmo 
W. Co. (1918), 39 Cal.App. 42 [J77 P. 866]; Scott v. Sciaroni 
(1924), 66 Cal.App. 577 P. 827]; Dawson v. Tttlare Union 
High Sch. (1929), 98 Cal.App. 138 [276 P. 424]; Nicholas v. 
Jacobson (1931), 113 Cal.App. 382 [298 P. 505]; Green v. 
Newmark (1933), 136 Cal.App. 32 P.2d 395]; Cash v. Los 
Angeles Ry. Corp. (1935), 6 Cal.App.2d 738 [45 P.2d 280]; 
Estate of Cnshing (1939), 30 Cal.App.2<l 340 [86 P.2d 375] ; 
Knecht v. Lombardo (1939), 33 Cal.App.2d 447 [91 P.2d 917]; 
Kersten v. Young (1942), 52 1 [125 P.2d 501]; 
Estate of Rabinowitz (1948). 48 Cal.App.2d 106 [135 P.2d 
579]; JJiacDonalcl v. Jackson (1953), 117 Cal.App.2d 598 [256 
P.2d 591]; Sanders v. MacFarlane's Candies (1953), 119 
Cal.App.2d 497 [259 P.2d 1010]; Lehman v. Richfield Oil 
Corp. (1953), 121 Cal.App.2d 261 [263 P.2d 13]; and, more 
recently, Palmq1rist v. Mercer, 48 Cal.2d 92 [272 P.2d 26]; 
Dunn v. Pacific Gas & Elec. 43 Cal.2d 265 [272 P.2d 745]; 
JJicBricle v. Atchison, T. & S. F. 44 Cal.2d 113 [279 
P.2d 966]; Warner v. Santa Catalina Island Co., 44 Cal.2d 
310 [282 P.2d 121 ; IIUyar v. Union Ice 4fi Cal.2d 30 [286 
P.2d 21] ; Raymond v. Indepcudcut Inc., 133 Cal. 
App.2d 154 [284 P.2d ;)7] ; Hale v. Stm'es, Inc., 129 
IN ATSONVU,LE Co::vnn;NITY HosP. 525 
305 P.2d 36] 
v. Rabing, 110 
City & County of 
[251 P.2d 687] ; Turner 
109 [254 P.2d 970] ; 
643 [272 P.2d 922]; Weber v. 
123 Cal.App.2d 328 [266 
126 Cal.App.2d 245 [272 
601 [284 P.2d 856] ; 
120 Cal.App.2d 537 [261 P.2d 553] ; 
Cal.2d 854 P.2d 550] ; Denbo v. 
153 [245 P.2d 650] ; Estate of 
P.2d 984]; Howard v. General Pe-
25 [238 P.2d 145]; Hellar v. 
424 [244 P.2d 757, 28 A.L.R.2d 1451] ; 
115 Cal.App.2d 735 [252 P.2d 751]; 
117 Cal..App.2d 376 [255 P.2d 456]; Mac-
Donald v. 117 Cal.App.2d 598 [256 P.2d 591] ; Ma-
rino v. Valenti, 118 Cal.App.2d 830 [259 P.2d 84] ; Refinite 
Sales Co. v. Freel R. Bright Co., 119 Cal.App.2d 56 [258 P.2d 
1116]; Warren v. 127 Cal.App.2d 224 [273 P.2d 569].) 
In the case under consideration an inference of negligence 
arose because of the proved fact that a foreign body, a Kelly 
clamp, was left in plaintiff's abdomen after she had under-
gone surgery performed by defendants in defendant hospital. 
'rhe clamp was not there prior to the surgery. That fact 
was proved by taken prior to the time the surgery 
was undertaken. In Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811, 825 [291 
P.2d 915], we quoting from Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 
Cal.2d 486, 491, 492 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258], that 
''Every defendant in whose custody the plaintiff was placed 
for any period was bound to exercise ordinary care to see that 
no unnecessary harm came to him and each would be liable for 
failure in this regard.'' We also said ( 45 Cal.2d at p. 826) 
that "where a plaintiff receives unusual injuries while un-
conscious and in the course of medical treatment, all those 
defendants 1vho had any control over his body or the instru-
mentalities which have caused the injuries may properly 
be callecl upon f o meet the of negligence by giving 
an explanation of their conduct." (Emphasis added.) In 
Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 86, 87 [199 P.2d 1, 5 A.L.R.2d 
91], speaking of an analogous situation, we said that "a 
patient injured while nnconscious on an operating table in 
a hospital could hold all or any of the persons who had any 
connection with the operation even though he could not select 
'' In the Ybarra case 
decision therein was that 
he had evidence which gave 
of which was the wr<>vim 
that it was then up to the 
the 
Plaintiff here and that Drs. 
Nurse Pogatschnik and the Watsonville 
Hospital had control of her unconscious person 
dominal surgery; that during that surgery a 
a foreign object-was left in her abdomen ""'ll""'"" 
suffering and injury. proved that 
of negligence arose and the duty llllHleuHu"''-' 
the defendants to rebut that inference of or be~ 
come liable to plaintiff in damages. In order to rebut the in-
ference of negligence, the defendants must make ''an affirma~ 
tive showing of a definite cause for the in which 
cause no element of negligence on the part of the defendant 
adheres, or of such care in all possible as "'"''""""a." 
to lead to the conclusion that the accident could not have 
pened from want of care, but must have been due to some 
unpreventable cause, although the exact cause is unknown." 
(Dierman v. Providence Hospital, 31 Oal.2d 290, 295 [188 
P.2d 12].) 
In Scott v. Burke, 39 Cal.2d 388 [247 P.2d 313], this court 
adopted the holding of Ales v. Ryan, 8 99 P.2d 
409], that "the inference of negligence which is created by 
the rule res ipsa loqttitttr is in evidence which may not 
be disregarded by the jury and which in the absence of any 
other evidence as to negligence, necessitates ·a verdict in favor 
the plaintiff." (Emphasis added.) 
The majority admits, as necessarily it must, that the res 
ipsa loquitur rule is applicable here and that an inference 
of negligence arose as to an these defendants. Despite this 
admission, the majority holds that evidence elicited under 
section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be considered 
and used to dispel the inference of negligence which arose as 
to Dr. Eiskamp. 
In so holding, the author of the majority opinion ignores 
the full impact of the rule set forth in the case of Crowe 
v. McBride, 25 Oal.2d 318, 319 [153 P.2d 727], in which he, 
speaking for this court, said : ''In considering the propriety 
of the nonsuit, we must accept the evidence most favorable 
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The 
added.) It has been said time and time 
the rnle well established that on appeal from 
the has a right to on such ""m·nr:'"" 
elicited under section 2055 
un•nrnnl'"'' to her and to dis-
wnrn"''"'" 'f)(J',('(,'/(j'f/S thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 2055; Crowe v. McBride, sup1·a; J[arstensen v. Western 
93 Cal.App.2d 435 [209 P.2d 47] ; Williams v. 
35 104 [94 P.2d 817] ; Young v. Bank 
95 Ca1App.2d 725 [214 P.2d 106, 16 A.hR.2d 
; Connors v. Southern Pac. Co., 91 Cal.App.2d 872 [206 
; Green v. 87 Cal.App.2d 77 [196 P.2d 63] ; 
Carlton v. Pac1>jic Coast Gasoline Co., 110 CaLApp.2d 177 
[242 P.2d 391] ; Mm·ino v. Valenti, 118 CaLApp.2d 830 [259 
P.2d Lopez v. Knight, 121 CaLApp.2d 387 [263 P.2d 
; Refinite Sales Co. v. Fred R. Bright Co., 119 CaLApp. 
2d 56 [258 P.2d 1116] ; Estate of Hull, 63 CaLApp.2d 135 
P.2d ; Estate of Burns, 26 CalApp.2d 741 [80 
P.2d ; Hiner v. Olson, 23 Cal.App.2d 227 [72 P.2d 890, 
73 P.2d 945] ; Whicker v. Crescent Atdo Co., 20 CaLApp.2d 
240 [66 P.2d 749]; Estate of Lances, 216 CaL 397 [14 P.2d 
7681 ; Lewis v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 116 Cal.App. 44 
P.2d , and others too numerous to mention.) 
We are now told that it has been "squarely held that an 
inference upon which a plaintiff relies may be completely dis-
pf'lled as a matter of law by evidence given by witnesses 
railed under section 2055. ( Crottch v. G1'lmore Oil Co., Ltd., 
5 Ca1.2d 333 P .2d 709] . ) " 
In Crouch v. Gilmore Oil Co., Ltd., supra, an appeal from 
a of nonsuit was involved. Plaintiff there sought 
to establish the issue of agency by defendant's testimony 
under section 2055. Plaintiff proved that the truck in ques-
while different in construction from that used by Gilmore 
, was Gilmore Oil with the r•olors used 
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by it and 4,500 of its service station on the Pacific 
Coast. Gilmore Oil also the sides of the truck with 
the word ''Gilmore'' and its insignia of 
the lion's head on the rear of the truck. On the doors of the 
truck were, however, painted the words ''Owens Valley Oil 
Company.'' Gilmore Oil sold Smith, the owner of the truck, 
its gasoline at a lower Testimony elicited under section 
2055 showed that the driver of the truck was by Smith, 
the owner. The court held, on the of 
Maupin v. Solomon, 41 Cal.App. P. 198], that the 
inference of agency was rebutted uncontradicted testimony 
given under section 2055. 
Mattpin v. Solomon, sttpra, involved an appeal from a judg-
ment for the plaintiff after a trial on the ancl the 
court held, merely, that an inference that the driver of de-
fendant's car was acting within the scope of his employment 
could not stand in the face of uncontradicted evidence to the 
contrary. Testimony adchwecl under section 2055 was not 
involved and it was not an appeal from either a nonsuit or a 
directed verdict. 
It is my opinion that the Crouch case was incorrectly de-
cided. The evidence on the issue of agency was sufficiently 
conflicting to make it a question of fact for the jury. Plaintiff 
was not bound by the testimony under section 2055 ·which 
was contrary to the inference arising from the facts above 
set forth. Furthermore, I do not see how Mr. Chief .Justice 
Gibson can cite, with approval, the Crouch case in view of 
his opinion in Crowe v. JJicBride, 25 Ca1.2d 318, 319 [153 
P.2d 727],* wherein he said, in spraking for the court: "In 
considering the propriety of the nonsuit, we must accept the 
evidence most favorable to plaintiffs and disregard that which 
is unfavorable. The testimony of the who was 
called to testify under sect?'on 205:! of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, falls within this rt1le and is to be treated as evi-
dence in the case 1:nsofar as H is favorable to plaintiffs." 
(Emphasis added.) It wonlc1 appear that the Crouch case 
was effectively overruled for all purposes by Crowe v. Mc-
Bride, sttpra, and the many other brtter reasoned cases both 
prior and subsequent thereto. In his analysis of Crowe v. 
McBt·ide, sttpra, the author of the majority opinion con-
veniently omits any mention of the case of Bnrr v. Shcrwt'n 
Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 688, 691 P.2d 1041], where-
*Even though he maintains it is not i11consistent. 
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in he, speaking for the court, said ''It is of course, 
that res ipsa loquitur raises an inference, not a presumption, 
and the general rule is that whether a inference 
shall be drawn is a question of fact for the , even in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary. (See Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1958; Blank v. Coffin, 20 Ca1.2d 461 P.2d 8G8] ; 
Hamilton v. Pacific EZcc. Ry. J2 Cal.2d G02-603 [86 
P.2d 829] .) This, docs not the conclusion 
that 1·cs ipsa logu.iltl1. may rise to a kind of 
ference which the defendant mnst fl,c 
of the inference is somewhat a76n to 
(Emphasis added.) 
Also in his endeavor to distiJJgnish the Crowe v. McBride 
case from the Crouch case (to the detriment of the Crowe 
case), the author of the majority opinion informs us that 
the quotation from the Crowe ease "must, of conrsr, be read 
in the light of the facts of the case and the question presrnted 
for determination. It is correct as a general proposition. 
and it should not be given a strained interpretation to reaeh 
a conclusion on a matter not presentec1 to or considered by 
the court.'' Thi:'l statement is grossly inaccurate. Crowe v. 
McBride involved an action for malpractire; defendant chiro-
practor's motion for a nonsuit was granted. 'l'he appeal >Yas 
from the order granting the nonsuit. Defendant's testimony 
under 2055 was treated as evidenee in the ease ag if 
was favorable to plah?tiffs and \Ye r0n•rsrd the jmlgment of 
nonsuit. It waR, therefore, not ncerssary to give t}JC 1angnage 
used there ''a strained interpretation to reach a eonclnsion on 
a matter not presented to or considered by the court.'' 
The majority opinion makes mnch of the faet that the 
doctrine of res ipi'la loquitur raises an inferrnre rather than 
a presumption and that a presumption may not be dispelle<l 
by evidence produced by an adYerse party, \Yhercas an in-
ference may be flO di:'lpellrd. In Bu1T v. Shcnnin W-ill?'arns 
Co., S1l]Jra, the author of this opinion sp<'cifieally held that 
the doctrine of res ipsa loqnitnr gaYe rise to a ''special kind of 
inference" which the defendant must rebut and that the 
effect of this particular inference wai'l ''somewhat akin to that 
of a presumption'' ! 
The law in this i'ltate has, nntiJ the ease at bar, always been 
that on a motion for a nonsuit a 1l eYidrnce elicitrd nnder 
section 2055 which is unfayorablc to the plaintiff must be 
disregarded. (Green Y. Uartc, 87 Cal.App.2d 75 rl% P.2d 
63]; Jep1Ji v. Brockman Holding Co., 3,1 CaL2d 11 [206 P.2d 
res 
a character that is ''akin 
involved inference that defendant truck 
driver was of Gilmore Oil 
It appears to me that the 
confused the issue. It 
has 
the inference of 
therein that 
as it ·is 
remains in the case until rebutted by the de-
the time-honored rule where an appeal 
of nonsuit is involved; it makes misleading 
statements and cites cases in support thereof which are not 
As another example, the statement in the majority 
that ''The same test is applicable in determining 
wh0n t1w inference is as a matter 
of law as in when any other inference is conclusively 
r0bntted. Rose v. 39 Cal.2d 481, 487 
P.2d Lcrd v. Union Pac. R. R. 25 Cal.2d 605, 
621-622 [J 55 P.2d 158 A.L.R. 1008].)" This follows the 
statement of contention that the inference of res 
was not dispelled as a matter of law and that 
therefore thr court erred in the motion for a nons1t1·t. 
Both the Rose and I;eet cases were appeals from judgments 
rendered a trial on the merits. NPither one involved 
a judgment of nonsuit. Then the author of 
makes this statement: "There how-
on this broad general rule rule on 
vvher0 nonsuit is . It is settled that where 
the evidence raises an inferencE' that a fact and either 
evidence of nonexistence of the fact 
uncontradict0d and of such a nature 
be; the nonexistence of 
matter of law. Blank 
P.2d .) " Tn Blank v. 
dence and may refuse a 
ference can be drawn from certain evidence 
but whether the inference shall be 
of fact for the 
§ 60.) 
'' introduces evidence to the 
nonexistence of and the must then 
determine the existence or nonexistence of the fact from all 
the evidence before it. If the evidence 
ence of the fact is positive, 
such a nature that it can not 
court must instruct the that the nonexistence of the fact 
has been established as a matter of law." It is 
that Blank v. Goffin does not stand for the for 
The Blank quotation continues thus: "The 
is the sole of the of the wit-
nesses (Cal. Code Oiv. § 1847; see cases cited in 27 
Oal.Jur. 182, § 156) and is free to them even 
are uncontradicted if there is any rational (f'f"flnnn 
so.'' The Blank case, incidentally, involved the ques-
tion of whether or not it was proper for the to draw 
the inference that the automobile was driven an 
employee of the owner with his at the time of the 
accident. A of the court m the Blank case held 
that the directed verdict was 
sufficient evidence "to permit the 
was driven with defendant's 
v. Auburn Anto. Sales J1 Oa1.2d 64 P.2d 1059], 
Crouch v. Gilmore Oil Oo., Ltd., supra, and Ceranski v. 
60 751 [141 P.2d , were all cases 
involving the inference of ownership. .Johnston v. Black Co., 
33 Cal.App.2d 363 [91 P.2d 921], involved the inference of 
res ipsa loquitur and a situation where the trial court had 
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directed verdict for the defendant on the ground of in-
sufticiency of the evidence after the jury had returned a ver-
dict for the plaintiff. The defendants, in the Johnston ease, 
had introcluced at the trial which dispelled the in-
pages 366 and 368). None of these cases, with 
the Crouch case, involved testimony elicited 
nncler section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The 
Crouch case has been discussed heretofore. 
Plaintiff here has her injury and defendants' causal 
connection therewith, and that inference of negligence re-
mains undispelled until an '' aftirmative showing of a definite 
cause for the accident, in which cause no element of negli-
gence on the part of the defendant adheres'' is made. There 
is here, therefore, no failure of proof as in the Crouch case. 
Plaintiff is not bound by any adverse testimony of any de-
fendant called under 2055. Had the case gone to the jury 
it was free to believe that Dr. Eiskamp may have used a Kelly 
clamp; that he did, at some time, during the surgery, work 
in the upper quadrant of plaintiff's abdomen; or that the 
clamp had, during the six months it remained in plaintiff's 
abdomen, worked its way to the position in which it was 
found. ''. . . the inference of negligence which is created 
by the rule res ipsa loqtliitlr is in itself evidence which may 
not be disregarded by the jury and which in the absence 
of any other evidence as to negligence, necessitates a verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff." (Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d 82, 99 
[64 P.2d 409] .) Plaintiff here had made out her case against 
all defendants by proving facts which raised an inference of 
negligence which remained in the case as evidence until dis-
pelled by the defendants. 
The following statement is made in the majority opinion: 
''A witness may, of course, be disbelieved if there is any 
rational ground for doing so, and the interest of a party, 
would in some circumstances justify the trier of fact in 
disregarding his testimony. (See Hamilton v. Abadjian, 
30 Cal.2d 49, 53 [179 P.2d 804] [nonsuit not involved]; 
Hicks v. Reis, 21 Cal.2d 654, 659-661 [134 P.2d 788] [non-
suit not involved]; Blank v. Coffin, 20 Cal.2d 457,461-462 [126 
P .2d 868] [reversal of directed verdict for defendant].) " It 
is, of course, elementary that the trier of fact may, on the 
trial of a case, disbelieve any witness or his testimony. We 
are here concerned with a nonsuit ( a,nd testimony taken under 
section 2055) where all of the plwintifj's evidence and the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom mnst be taken as true and 
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all conflicts in the evidence must be Any evi-
dence elicited under section 2055 to the effect that Dr. Eiskamp 
did not operate in the field where the elamp was later 
found merely creates a conflict ·with other evidence from 
which the evidence of his negligence may be inferred and 
must, under heretofore ci.ted cases, be 
The following statement from the is 
totally irrelevant where, as here, an from a judgment of 
nonsuit is involved: ''There are situations, where 
the interest of a party in obtaining a jmlgmcnt favorable to 
himself will not render all of his testimony subjeet to dis-
belief. For example, where part of a defendant's testimony 
is harmful to hi.m but favorable to a codefendant, as where 
it tends to show that the witness is liable or makes it more 
difficult for him to establish his own lack of fault, that por-
tion of his testimony may be used to rebut an inference 
unfavorable to the codefenrlant provided there is nothing to 
indicate collusion or any other reason for disbelieving the 
testimony." The q1rcstion of testimony docs not 
enter into the case when a motion for· a nonswit is made. The 
defendant, in making the moh"rm, admits that all plaintiff's 
case is tnlC. (People v. One 1940 Buick 71 Oal.App.2d 
160 [162 P.2d 318] ; Seaford v. Smith, 86 Oal.App.2d 339 [194 
P.2d 792]; Mastro v. Kennedy, 57 Oal.App.2d 499 [134 P.2d 
865] ; Moore v. Belt, 34 Cal.2d 525 [212 P.2d ; Connors 
v. Smdhern Pac. Co., 91 Cal.App.2d 872 [206 P.2d 31] ; 
Karstensen v. ·western Transp. Co., 93 Oal..App.2d 435 [209 
P.2d 47] ; Carlton v. Pacific Coast Gasoline Co., 110 Oal.App. 
2d 177 [242 P.2d 391]; Baley v. J. F. Hink & Son, 133 Cal. 
App.2d 102 [283 P.2d 349] ; New Zealand Ins. Co. v. Brown, 
110 Oal.App.2d 411 [242 P.2d 674] ; dcA.J"yan v. Butler, 
119 Oal.App.2d 674 [260 P.2d 98] .) 
The majority opinion states: ''The evidence as to Eiskamp 's 
participation in the operation consisted of the testimony of 
T_~acy, Slegal and Eiskamp, and it was elear and uncontradicted 
to the effect that Eiskamp was not responsible for the 
clamp in plaintiff's abdomen. This testimony did not in 
any way tend to benefit T_~acy or Slcgal bnt, to the rontrary, 
was disadvantageous to them because the exoneration of one 
defendant ·wonld have the necessary ('ffeet of inereasing the 
possibility of liability on the pm·t of Paeh of the other rle-
fendmlts. The record indicates no ratimml gTonnd for dis-
believing their testimony, and we hold that the i11ferenee raised 
against Eiskamp under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was 
upon which the 
in the statement from 
of a witness called under 
section 2060 may be us,;d to an inference upon which 
the ntiff the evidence is clear, 
uncontradicted and of such a nature that it cannot rationally 
It appropriate to allow such 
rebnt the inference in eases like 
because she was unconscious 
the treatment that resulted in her 
of liberalized for res 
persons who hail any control O\'Cr her 
strumentalities 1vhielt have eausecl her injuries are re-
to meet the inference of negligence g1vmg an 
of their conduct. If in these circumstances evidence 
section 20;)5 establishes as a matter of 
defendants is free from the 
that defendant based on the inference 
's with to that clcf'end-
same as if she had failed to prove an nw 
necessary to raise the inference." 
It is for me to rationalize the state-
the application of' a brand of mental 
do not possess. \Vhat I think it means 
of Drs. 
under the doeirinc of res 
rrmaim; in thr caRe until rebutted 
as ''a liberalized test for 
than liberal to 
vvant to do here is 
remedial effect of both section 2055 and the 
doctrine. It is this result 
eertain here-"establishes as a matter 
of' law that a defendant is free from " notwith-
the law has established an inferenee of 
him. Is this the product of rational 
ca;ov"'"'"' be so obtuse~ Should such conflicts exist in 
our law? l\iy answer to these is an NO. 
The real difficulty is, the failure of the process to 
function. The majority here desires to reach a result which 
cannot be reached by the application of So 
it resorts to sophistry and it becomes enmeshed in a maze 
of conflicts. The judicial process operates in reverse order. 
It proceeds from the premise that we have a which 
is under attack. To determine the validity of this judgment, 
we apply legal tests-rules of law-and we accept the result 
which flows from this process. In pursuit of this process, we 
avoid conflicts and the law becomes a smoothly operating 
machine geared to the efficient administration of 
Applying the judicial process to this case, we find that 
under section 2055, as construed all of the authorities, 
plaintiff may establish her case by the testimony of adverse 
witnesses; she may do this without being bound by any testi-
mony which is unfavorable to her. So far as her case in 
chief is concerned, all testimony unfavorable to her must 
be disregarded the same as if it were not in the record. The 
testimony favorable to her establishes an inference of negli-
gence against all defendants. She may rest her case on such 
evidence, secure against a motion for a nonsuit. The judgment 
of nonsuit against her was therefore erroneous and should be 
reversed. This always has been the law of this state since 
section 2055 was enacted and would still be the law if the 
judicial process was followed in this case. 
It would be just as honest, and do less harm to the law, 
if the majority, in order to reach the result it would 
hold that no infere11ce of negligence arose against Dr. Eiskamp 
because the undisputed evidence shows that he did not 
use a Kelly clamp in the portion of the operation he performed 
in plaintiff's abdomen. While I could not join in such holding, 
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1s that is necessary for a plaintiff to show 
that a defendant was an aetive participant in the negligent 
aet whieh resulted in the injury complained of in order to 
establish an inference of negligence against such defendant 
under the res loquitur doctrine. This was the holding 
of this court in Senm·is v. Haas, 45 Cal.2d 811 [291 P.2d 915], 
where a judgment of nonsuit in favor of Dr. Haas was affirmed. 
But the holds that under the evidence here 
an inference of negligence arose against Dr. Eiskamp and I 
agree with this holding. It appears to be the law of this state, 
however, that whether a particular inference can be drawn 
from certain evidence is a question of law, but whether the 
inference shall be drawn, in any given case, is a question of 
fact for the jury. (See cases cited in 10 Cal.Jur. 738-739, 
§ 60.) 
In view of the foregoing rule it would obviously be more 
logical for the majority to conclude that under the evidence 
produced here no inference of negligence arose against Dr. 
Eiskamp. In so holding the majority would have at least 
a semblance of authority to support its otherwise wholly 
unfounded conclusion. 
We have held (Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d 82, 95, 100 [64 P.2d 
409]) that leaving a foreign object in a patient's abdomen 
does not ordinarily occur without negligence and in Ybarra 
v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258], 
that when a patient receives unusual injuries while unconsci-
ous, all defendants having any control over his body or the 
instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may 
be called upon to rebut the inference of negligence by giving 
an explanation of their conduct. Nurse Pogatschnik, as an 
employee of the hospital, was one of the defendants having 
"control" over the unconscious body of the plaintiff. Plaintiff 
established through the testimony of Mrs. Evelyn Craig, 
superintendent of defendant hospital, who was called under 
section 2055, that it was not the practice of the hospital, 
through its nurse employees, to make an instrument count 
after surgery. vVhether such an omission constituted negli-
gence was answered adversely to defendant hospital in Ales 
v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d 82, 100 [64 P.2d 409], where this court 
said: "We have already held upon authority that the failure 
to remove a sponge from the abdomen of a patient is negli-
gence of the ordinary type and that it does not involve 
knowledge of materia medica surgery but that it belongs to 
that class of mental lapses which frequently occur in the usual 
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routine of business and commerce, and in the multitude of 
affairs which come within the group of ordinary 
actionable The layman needs no scientific en-
lightenment to see at once that the omission can be accounted 
for on no other than that someone has committed action-
able negligence.'' Mrs. Craig also testified, although her 
testimony is not on creates merely a con-
flict in the and may be that it was not the 
custom of in the to make an instrument 
count after surgery. I am of the opinion that the majority 
opnnon discusses this testimony as failing to 
''dispel'' the inference of negligence as to the hospital and 
surgical nurse. Plaintiff is not bound by any adverse testi-
mony elicited under section 2055, as I have heretofore pointed 
out. The testimony as to custom merely created a conflict 
in the evidence and might be considered adverse to plaintiff 
if it were not for cases holding that ''General negligence 
cannot be excused on the ground that others in the same 
locality practice the same kind of negligence." (Ales v. Ryan, 
8 Cal.2d 82, 100 [64 P.2d 409] .) It vvas also said in Pattly v. 
King, 44 Cal.2d 649, 655 [284 P.2d 487], quoting from Owen 
v. Rheem JJ!fg. Co., 83 Cal.App.2d 42, 45 [187 P.2d 785], that 
"Custom may assist in the determination of what constitutes 
due care. \Vhat others do is some evidence of what should 
be done, but custom is never a substitute for due care.'' 
vVe have repeatedly held that a hospital must exercise 
reasonable care towards a patient as his known condition may 
require (Wood v. Sarna1·itan Institution, Ine., 26 Cal.2d 847, 
851 [161 P.2d 556] ; Riee v. California Lutheran Hospital, 27 
Cal.2d 296, 302 [163 P.2d SGO] ; Ault v. Ross General Hospital, 
105 Cal.App.2d 78, 80 [232 P.2d 528]). "If the alleged 
neglect relates to matters or conduct which are reasonably 
within the ken of the average layman the jury may determine 
the culpability of the person charged therewith without the 
aid of experts. If it relates solely to the exercise of judgment 
in the application of skill and learning then proof of the 
negligence must be made by experts.'' (Valentin v. La 
Societe Francm:se, 76 Cal.App.2d 1, 5 [172 P.2d 359] ; Dean 
v. Dyer, 64 Cal.App.2d 646, 653 r149 P.2d 288] ; Stevenson 
v. Alta Bates, Inc., 20 Cal.App.2d 303, 309 [66 P.2d 1265]; 
Inderbitzen v. Lane Hospital, 124 Cal.App. 462 [12 P.2d 
744, 13 P.2d 905].) It appears to me that the failure to make 
an instrument count to surgery is a matter "reason-
ably within the ken'' of the average layman to permit the jury, 
failure constituted 
reasonable care towards a as his known 
may (Valentin v. La Societe 
1, 5 P.2d 359]; Wood v. Samaritan In-
26 Cal.2d 851 P.2d 556]). But, the 
arisen because of the 
in abdomen surgery 
the defendants had control of her unconscious 
of whether such existed was 
of fact on a trial of the issues involved. The 
evidence adduced plaintiff, with the favorable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom, when conflicting evidence 
was more than sufficient to permit the cause to 
the jury, or the court, as the case may be. 
It is to rationalize the majority opinion on any 
of law or logic. It certainly finds no support in the 
prior decisions of this court or the appellate courts of this 
state. In the absence of any basis in legal philosophy for 
the holding it is obvious that considerations of ex-
pediency have controlled. I submit that such considerations 
are foreign to the judicial concept. If the law is to be 
changed, the Legislature is the law-making body, and such 
change should be brought about by legislation and not by 
judicial fiat. In our constitutional form of government, with 
its system of checks and balances, the Legislature is more 
responsive to the will of the people than the courts and any 
change in public policy or statutory law should originate 
with it. I submit that the action of this court here invades 
the province of the Legislature in a most vital field of legisla-
tion and public policy as it repeals or nullifies the provision 
in section 2055 of the Code of Civil Procedure that a party 
is not bound by testimony elicited under this section. 
I would reverse the judgments of nonsuit as to defendants 
Eiskamp, Pogatschnik and the 'Watsonville Community Hos-
pital. 
SHENK, J.-I dissent. I am in agreement with the dis-
senting opinion of Mr. J nstiee Carter insofar as he concludes 
that the majority opinion has misapplied section 2055 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure and the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur. It is vH~ll establis1wd by the authorities in this 
state and cited Mr. Justiee Carter that the plaintiff may, 
under seetion eall thr; defendants as adverse witnesses 
and 
without 
bound that unfavorable to him 
for the purposes of a motion for a be dis-
however or or even conclusive it 
be in favor of the defendants and the 
in the trial on the merits. The 
benefit of whatever of that is favorable to 
him and that portion only is to be considered in evidence for 
the purpose of a nonsuit. For that purpose the 's 
case is supported all favorable inferences that may be drawn 
from that testimony. Those inferences may be in addition to 
the inference included in the doctrine of res 
which alone is sufficient to take the case to trial on the merits. 
The question of when an inference in favor of the 
may be dispelled by the testimony of his own witnesses is not 
involved in this case. In law the defendants, when called by 
the plaintiff under section 2055, are not the plaintiff's wit-
nesses. With the rule now announced by the majority a 
plaintiff may not call a defendant for examination under that 
section except at the peril of having the testimony so taken 
and which is unfavorable to him used against him in support 
of a motion for a nonsuit. This is an unfortunate and con-
fusing deviation from the established rules. Under the au-
thorities the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is applicable to this 
case and its beneficial purpose is effectively destroyed if in 
calling the defendants as adverse witnesses the must 
assume the hazard of having them justify their conduct and 
by their own testimony obtain a judgment of nonsuit. The 
record shows without question that the testimony of the de-
fendants obtained under section 2055 insofar as it is favorable 
to the plaintiff is in support of the inference of negligence, 
and that inference has not been dispelled either in fact or in 
law. The defendant Eiskamp took part in the operation and 
he should be required to defend on the merits along with his 
codefendants. 
The petition of respondents \Vatsonville Community Hos-
pital and Kay Pogatschnik for a rehearing was denied Janu-
ary 16, 1957. 
